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COMMUNICATIONS
tain ways. For example, the original version of an
On the Rogow principle (APSR [September article of mine called "The Representative and
1974], p. 1281) two corrections, one on that very His District," when finally published, was repage of importance, the other on p. 1001. Does jected by this Review with the friendly comment
Mr. Miller (p. 1001) have any evidence that fans that it was a disgrace to the profession that any"became disinterested in baseball because of lack one calling himself a political scientist should subof speed'? Nonfans may not have been attracted mit such an article! Applied Anthropology (Hufor that reason, but in good sports towns like man Organization) later published it, it has been
Boston and Detroit, has there been disenchant- reprinted or I have received requests at any rate
ment? One doubts it! The editor should have to have it republished about twenty-five times, it
is one of the better selling Bobbs Merrill reprints,
picked that up.
the
More seriously,
reference to Einstein on it is widely cited. Similarly, an article entitled
p. 1281 is quite misleading; I don't know whether "The Politics and Sociology of Stupidity" was
the journal in which Einstein's article appeared rejected by the American Journal of Mental Dehad referees, but David Lindsay Watson (Scien- ficiency with two pages of advice about the serious
tists Are Human [London, Watts & Co., 1938]) psychiatric condition which the referee felt I must
shows us the theoretical reasons for the exten- suffer from; yet it was published in Social Probsively documented fact that it can confidently be lems, has been widely cited, republished, and, I
anticipated that most referees will not evaluate am told, also been influential on several theses
most unconventional articles "on their merits." and studies.
Of the 80 or so articles I have had published, I
Watson leads us to think that in science Admiral
Lord Fisher's aphorism "favoritism is the secret of believe the modal article has experienced at least
effectiveness," applies. Innovative work, for rea- six rejections; several have been rejected at least
sons also developed by R. T. LaPiere (Social fifteen times (notably "Standards for RepresentaChange [New York: McGraw Hill, 1965]) is tive Selection and Apportionment, "Nomos, volpretty sure, generally speaking, to be turned down ume on Representation- which has been used by
by established, conventional referees. It is handi- several authors in some detail, and assigned in
capped not only by its intrinsic unconventionality quite a number of classes).
It is important in sociology of knowledge terms
but by the generally relevant circumstance that
most original and innovative writers are "imper- to indicate that types of articles are pretty sure to
fectly socialized" in a profession, and so their be rejected, precisely because they are unconvenstyle, approach, citations, etc., are ordinarily tional, original contributions. For instance, the
likely to offend the better established members of typical academic article nowadays is linear in its
that profession. In other words, the implication of logic; a implies b, b implies c, d follows from c,
what I am saying is that no unconventional etc. But some great writers-Kenneth Burke, Edwriter can get judgment on the merits by normal mund Burke, David Riesman, and, I believe,
methods of referee selection-Einsteins would Richard Hooker-follow a different model; they
hardly ever get by, and even writers who are walk around a set of problems, as though in a
merely six years ahead or a generation behind the circle, looking at the problems now from this
times will have it tough. Look at the experience of standpoint, then from that, etc., etc. Such articles
Semmelweiss, Lister, Lobachevski, or Riemann are pretty sure to be turned down; and, I must
confess, knowing this, I have weakened some of
in the "hard" sciences for pertinent cases-or
early reviews of Lasswell or of the later work of what I have written, by shifting it from that perspective to the linear approach, to seem more
Arthur F. Bentley in this journal.
Fortunately, in a society like ours, with plenty normal.
LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER
of outlets some fortunate concatenation of circumstances may ultimately get two or three ref- Harvard University
erees who will take risks; or with good luck one
can get favoritism on merit. This takes persistence, To THEEDITOR:
however, which many original people do not
In the March 1974 issue of this Review Stephen
have; and this letter is simply a suggestion to G. Salkever (in his "Virtue, Obligation, and Polipeople rudely turned down by referees to keep tics," pp. 78-92) asserts that the examination of
at it.
the obligation and virtue conceptions of politics
My statement is based partly on personal ex- "is as important for students of politics and politiperience; I am surely no Einstein or Riemann, cal philosophy as it is for students of ethics and
but I may have been five or six years ahead in cer- moral philosophy" (p. 78). Salkever thereupon
TO THEEDITOR:
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begins an impressive classificatory account full of
historical attributions to the great political philosophers and supporting citations. His aim is to
show the prominence that "obligation" and
"virtue" have had in the history of political
thought: "virtue' being primarily important in
ancient political philosophy and "obligation"
being of essentially modern significance.
This combination of conceptual analysis, historical examination, and supporting exegesis is
standard in contemporary political philosophy. I
have no objection to this endeavor provided both
the political philosopher, such as Salkever, and
his readers are clear on what it actually achieves.
To mistake preliminary conceptual and historical
concerns for the main task of political philosophy
or to consider such preliminaries sufficient by
themselves is to miss the major point of political
philosophy: to make prescriptive and evaluative
political judgments and to justify them rationally.
Salkever begins his discussion by citing several
articles in contemporary moral philosophy and
claims to apply the distinction made in that field
between the ethics of virtue and the ethics of obligation as it was made by the moral philosopher
William K. Frankena (whom Salkever cites on
p. 78). But Salkever appears to have ignored the
essential justificatory element of contemporary
moral philosophy emphasized by Frankena himself in his well-known volume Ethics (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), which surprisingly is not mentioned by Salkever. In it Frankena
states that concern over the meaning of terms such
as "virtue" and "obligation" is subordinate in
importance, and of instrumental value only, to
the justification of ethical judgments (see Ethics,
pp. 78-79).
We perform conceptual analysis for the purpose
of clarifying the quintessential problem of normative discourse: the justification of our judgments.
Salkever seems to recognize this point early in his
discussion when he says that moral philosophers'
concern for clarifying "virtue" and "obligation"
"may be able to develop arguments to suggest that
one or another ethical language is best equipped
to deal with the broadest range of substantive
ethical questions" (p. 78, emphasis added). He
asserts several times throughout the article, however, that all he claims is that one concept
("virtue") be considered as an alternative to the
allegedly dominant concept ("obligation") in
modern political philosophy. For example, Salkever writes: "I am not here concerned to provide
a conclusive showing of the wrongness of these
formulations [based on the concept of 'obligation'], but only to show why it seems advisable
to think seriously about alternatives" (p. 91, see
also pp. 86 and 92).
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Thus, Salkever's essay provides neither an argument for a particular political philosophy nor
grounds in support of the largely implicit claim
that the concept of "virtue" is as good as or superior to "obligation" as a defining concept for
politics. At the conclusion of Salkever's discussion
the reader is confronted with the following odd
remark: " . . . I have made no effort in this discussion to deal with the epistemological, logical
and moral issues which are involved in the question of the justifiability of the paradigm change
[from 'virtue' to 'obligation']" (p. 92).
What has Salkever done for us? He has proposed an admittedly undefendeddefinition of politics complete with historical lineage as an alternative to the one he claims is widely accepted today.
In addition he adds the trivializing claim that
"political philosophy can be formulated" (p. 85,
emphasis added) according to the prescribed alternative. Now what are we to do? Salkever is
revealingly silent and terminates his essay before
he even raises, much less attempts to illuminate,
the essential problem: which concept-"virtue" or
"obligation"-should we accept, and for what
reasons should we accept it? In "Virtue, Obligation and Politics" Salkever presents the preliminaries without the main bout. After all, the preliminaries are supposed to lead to the main attraction (the problem of justification) which is
their raison d'etre.
A political theorist who proposes the acceptance of a particular conception of politics is responsible for the defense of this prescription and
its preferability to competing conceptions. Salkever admits he does not do this and thereby
weakens his claim for our attention. Such definitional exercises as Salkever's (and many more I
could cite) have obvious consequences. Political
philosophers and political scientists are faced with
an overwhelming and confusing array of subject
matter or field-defining concepts, exacerbated
only by the proposal of still more concepts
claimed to be "better." These linguistic proposals
stand alone and apart from the necessary discussion and defense of the relationship between conceptual analysis and the main tasks of normative
political philosophy, and empirical political science: justification and explanation, respectively.
To argue merely that politics can be formulated
according to this or that concept is of little importance. We must first achieve the'crucial epistemological aims of justification and explanation
for normative and empirical political discourse.
Contrary to Salkever's limited classificatory aim,
we must give greater care and thoughtfulness to
the very logico-epistemological issues he chooses
to omit (see his quote above). The conceptual
clarification thus achieved will indeed aid in the
making of better political judgments.
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This point about carrying the conceptual analysis and linguistic prescription far enough to be
significant for political inquiry holds for both
empirical and normative political theorizing. In
empirical research the proposal of a particular
conceptual framework or schema is not by itself
an instance of genuine theorizing, but only
"taxonornizing," "classifying," or "typologizing"
in the words of one author (A. James Gregor, An
Introductionto Metapolitics [New York: The Free
Press, 1971], p. 171). The proposed framework is
useful toward and used to achieve the distinctive
aims of empirical discourse: to make and test the
claims of description and explanation. Thus, the
proposal of a conceptual framework is distinguished from the actual empirical assignments
made according to it (see Israel Scheffler, Science
and Subjectivity [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1967], pp. 36-44).
Only the actual assignments are empirically
tested. Then and only then can the preferability of
a proposed conceptual recommendation be judged
rationally according to how it improves the formulation of empirical claims. In short, the proposal of classificatory schemata per se without
claims of explanation and their tests are literally
undeterminable and of no actual (as opposed to
potential) use to the empirical political scientist.
This crucial empirical process of concept formation and assignment is instructive for normative
political inquiry. The mere prescription of a particular concept such as Salkever's discussion of
"virtue" is inadequate without reasoned defense
of the following: Why should we accept the prescribed concept, and more importantly, precisely
how will this concept help us realize the aim of
normative political discourse, i.e., to make and
justify normative political judgments? So many
linguistic recommendations for various concepts
go unused because they are undefended and lack
adequate grounds for acceptance. To stop at
classificatory conceptual analysis and omit this
required discussion as Salkever does is to terminate the discussion of political philosophy just
where it begins to achieve its point, and is typical
of what is wrong with much of contemporary
political theorizing: preoccupation with the conceptual preliminaries without ever going on to the
main bout of the justification.
I regret to conclude that Salkever's essay makes
promises or claims with little or no attempt to
fulfill or support them. This occurs because their
author is preoccupied with conceptual preliminaries which are only of instrumental value.
Works like "Virtue, Obligation, and Politics"
lend support to the stereotypical view held by
political scientists that contemporary philosophy,
including, of course, political philosophy, consists
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of nothing more than inconsequential word
games.
JOELKASSIOLA
Brooklyn College, City University of New York
TO THEEDITOR:
I understand Mr. Kassiola to be making the
following argument:
(1) Salkever is supposed to be doing political
philosophy.
(2) Political philosophy is concerned with the
formulation and justification of normative judgments, and not with the clarification and classification of normative concepts.
(3) Conceptual clarification is not even useful
for justification unless it can show us how to test
the validity of normative (evaluative or justificatory) claims, just as a scientific taxonomy is useless unless it can be related to a way of testing
descriptive and explanatory claims.
(4) Therefore, contrary to his self-understanding, Salkever is neither doing, nor helping anyone
else to do, political philosophy.
I respond:
(1) I do not claim to be doing political philosophy. In my paper I am trying only to show what
political philosophy does, and some of the ways
in which it does it. I find it difficult to blame myself for the excessive modesty of this attempt,
whatever its other shortcomings may be.
(2) Political philosophy is concerned with justification in a way that my paper is not, and of
course justification is more important than clarification. Unfortunately, however, what is first by
nature is not always first for us, a fact which seems
to me to be too little known. I value a good clarification much more highly than a poor justification,
at least partly because we do not suffer from a
shortage of justifications.
(3) "Virtue, Obligation, and Politics" is neither
an attempt to present an abstract taxonomy nor
an attempt to establish one mode of evaluation as
uniquely entitled to our esteem. What I tried to do
was to say what the meaning of two modes of
evaluation is, both in terms of the epistemological
and ontological (or psychological) foundations of
those modes, and in terms of their powers of
making moral and political discriminations. It is
difficult to see how the attempt to clarify in this
sense could be identified with the activity of prescriptive taxonomizing. Perhaps the simplest way
of putting-the difference would be to say that my
intention was reflective and interpretive rather
then creative.
(4) Justification cannot be understood, much
less written, without a thoughtful consideration of
the terms involved and the questions asked. While

1975

it might well be argued that the scientific project
can proceed very well without such introspection,
I would say that political philosophy and its
study can not. The problem is that we know too
much; we need no one to tell us how "to make
and justify normative political judgments." What
we need is not assistance in formulating new
judgments, but reflection about the significance of
the ones we inevitably make.
STEPHENSALKEVER

Bryn Mawr College
To
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THE EDITOR:

It is a pleasure to be associated with Walter
Dean Burnham, even if we must share the honor
of criticism by Philip Converse (September, 1974).
In my own defense, let me plead that I do read
The American Voter, with the reverence appropriate to a revered text. I seek to avoid following the
graven images of straw men, attempt to reconcile
disparities in the received wisdom, and fear for
my correlations when they transgress the laws of
SRC. Nevertheless, like most sacred texts, The
American Voter did adopt a tone of proclaiming
general, not time-specific truths. Its emphasis on
the inherent limitations of the mass public, indeed, largely precludes the possibility of a different paradigm of electoral behavior.
The data for The American Voterwere gathered
almost two decades ago. That this work is still
worth reading is testament to its original quality,
but its authors need not insist on its character as
holy writ. An earlier American intellectual,
Thomas Jefferson, suggested political revolution
every twenty years. Surely innovation in political
science can be permitted with no lesser frequency.
GERALD M. POMPER

Rutgers University
TO THEEDITOR:

Robert Forster's review (APSR, 68 [June,
1974], 811-12) of my book, Provincial Magistrates
and Revolutionary Politics in France, 1789-1795,
includes six points on which I want to comment.
(1) "He observes 'the absence of a written cahier
does not prove that concern and awareness were
lacking' (p. 151). But then, what does it prove?
This is the kind of interpretive acrobatics that
Dawson is frequently tempted to perform. .."
Absence of a written cahier might indicate that,
as a tactic, preparation of such a document
seemed less promising than some more informal
means of influencing local political processes; or,
since not every fact proves a significant conclusion
and since historians ought to avoid interpretive
acrobatics, the absence of a written cahier might
indicate nothing in particular.

(2) "Is roll-call analysis not feasible for the
magistrates as deputies?"
As I said in my book, the National Assembly
majority "rejected the idea of publishing or even
preserving lists showing how individuals voted in
each roll-call vote" (p. 194, with a footnote giving
the date of this decision, 9 July 1789).
(3) "It is again unfortunate that the chapter on
the 'magistrates as deputies' is based on the letters
(475 of them, to be sure) of only two magistrates
from the old province of Maine."
The chapter is also based on 105 letters from a
magistrate from Lorraine and a total of 117
letters from five magistrates from various provinces and the journal entries of two other magistrates from Poitou (p. 196, footnotes).
(4) "I remain unconvinced that these magistrates were bound by likemindedness in political
matters, . . . "
Good. As I said (p. 325), "There were a few
active opponents of constitutional monarchy,
some of whom fought in royalist armies against
the republic . .. Finally, a very small number of
former bailliage magistrates were uncompromising, revolutionary republicans."
(5) " . . . and [unconvinced] that regional variation did not play the role it apparently did
among advocates."
Good. As I said (p. 254), "Former magistrates
were politically strong in a few places, . . . and
notably weak in others . . . " and (p. 309) "The
smaller the town, the greater the likelihood that a
former bailliage magistrate might continue as an
influential personage or even occupy office" and
(p. 313) "An exceptional concatenation of circumstances could, however, send to the guillotine
a substantial proportion of the former magistrates of a particular locality."
(6) Among "a host of a broad sociological hypotheses" seemingly to be found in my book is
one "about noble vs. commoner."
This characterization comes strangely from a
historian who has (convincingly) argued that
"whoever won the Revolution, the noble landlord lost."* At all events, that more than 80 per
cent of the members of the parlements were
noblemen is not a hypothesis but a fact; and that
about 90 per cent of the bailliage magistrates were
commoners is likewise a fact. That the parlements
and the bailliages, in their great majority, were on
opposite sides of the political fence in 1789 is also
a fact. Causal inferences are always hypothetical,
or else false; on this, I suppose, we agree.
PHILIP DAWSON

Brooklyn College, City University of New York
* Past and Present, no. 37 (July, 1967), p. 86.

